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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Mozambique 
 




In recent decades, Mozambique has undergone enormous political and economic 
transformations. A colony of Portugal, the country moved to a phase of socialism after 
gaining independence in 1975 but, after economic collapse, in 1986 it started 
implementing a program of economic reform aimed at establishing a market economy 
in the country. During this period, Mozambique suffered an armed conflict. As a 
result of the conflict and other socio-economic transformations, production collapsed 
during much of the period to 1993. From 1994, and with the combination of peace, 
political stability, economic reform and large aid flows, the country shifted from 
being the poorest country in the world to achieving the highest growth rates in the 
region. Poverty rates have been significantly reduced and agricultural incomes have 
increased. 
In Mozambique 75 percent of the population depends on agriculture for their 
livelihoods (Bias and Donovan 2003). For this reason, government interventions in 
the agricultural sector potentially have large impacts on many people’s welfare. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze and measure such interventions for a group of 
agricultural products during the past three decades of economic transformation. We 
focus on whether interventions effectively tax or subsidize producers and processors 
of selected agricultural products. We do so by computing different measures of 
assistance, most notably the nominal rate of assistance to farmers (NRA) for the 
period 1975-2004. The products analyzed are the main cash and food crops: cotton, 
cashew, sugar, tobacco, cassava, maize, beans, rice and groundnuts. These products 
represent around two-thirds of the value of primary agriculture production in the 
country.    
Despite a lack of data availability for some years regarding prices, margins 
and transport costs, the estimated coefficients suggest the existence of three clear 
periods regarding government intervention in the agriculture sector. In the first period,  
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when established fixed or minimum prices were imposed by central government, 
producers are clearly taxed in order to subsidize consumer prices. This period is 
followed by a process of price liberalization in the 1990s, where assistance measures 
become positive, mainly due to liberalization and the rationalization of import duties 
and taxes. In the third period (from the late 1990s) we observe an average reduction of 
assistance rates and an increase in their volatility (associated with large exchange rate 
depreciations in the presence of price sluggishness).  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe 
the agricultural sector in Mozambique. The main policy interventions in the past three 
decades in the sector are then summarized. The following section reports the main 
distortion measures used and the estimated rates of assistance. The reasons behind the 
evolution of policies in Mozambique are explored before, in the last section, we 
conclude by discussing prospects for further policy reform. 
 
 
The agricultural sector in Mozambique’s economy 
 
 
The recent history of Mozambique can be divided into four different periods based on 
the economic and political environments of the time (Wuyts 1978, 1984): a highly 
regulated and dependent colonial economy prior to independence; a central planning 
period following independence in 1975; a high-intensity war period involving 
economic collapse; and a post-war period characterized by policy reform, large aid 
flows and high rates of economic growth after the peace agreements. These periods 
can be clearly identified when analyzing agricultural development in Mozambique. 
 
Prior to independence 
 
During this period, the monetized economy was equally divided into output from 
plantations, settlers and peasants. Production was highly specialized across provinces. 
For instance, Zambezia, a central province, specialized in plantation crops such as tea, 
copra, and sugar cane. Nampula, in the North, was the center of cashew and cotton  
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production, the two most important peasant cash crops, and it also produced most of 
Mozambique’s sisal and tobacco.  
Agriculture was highly regulated. Production of cash crops was structured 
around geographical concessions, where only specific crops could be cultivated, and 
there was a system of forced labor. Prices of production were fixed by negotiation 
between the colonial government, concession firms and farmers.
1 Agricultural 
commerce was carried out by a parastatal marketing board.  
 
1975 to 1986 
 
Immediately after independence, the massive emigration of the settler population and 
the concomitant capital flight generated large falls in production and marketed 
outputs. In 1976, the export value of agricultural crops decreases by 40 percent as 
compared to 1973. The then Liberation Front (FRELIMO) proceeded with 
nationalization of several firms, but, surprisingly, the emigration of former colonizers 
did not lead to land reform. In fact, instead of distributing freed land to peasants, the 
Government took over abandoned land which laid the foundation for the creation of 
large state farms in the years to come. State intervention in agriculture, mainly 
organized in large-scale productive units, rose to 52 percent of total production by 
1982 (Hanlon 1984, Wuyts 1984). 
The marginalization of the peasantry and the lack of structured state assistance 
contributed to the fall in production of both cash and food crops. Large investments to 
overturn the situation could not be financed from internal savings, and between 1975 
and 1982 the monetary value of agricultural output fell by almost 30 percent.
2
Agricultural policy during this period therefore can be characterized by an 
intensification of regulation in what was already a highly regulated sector, a 
suppression of private initiative, and a policy bias towards larger farms. Prices were 
fixed at all stages of the supply chain, and producer prices were set low in order to 
subsidize consumers. The setting of mandatory producer prices below market-clearing 
levels encouraged the emergence of parallel black markets from the early 1980s. 
                                                 
1 The colonial government would set producer and consumer prices, as well as marketing margins at all 
stages of production (Tarp 1990). These were negotiated with settlers’ farm associations. Prices would 
vary according to province of origin and quality.  




1987 to 1994 
 
In 1987 the Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP) began, and it made a clean break 
from past policies. Many official fixed prices for agricultural goods were liberalized 
and others became just minimum indicative prices. Private traders entered the 
commercialization system. This caused a marked increase in consumer prices in 
formal markets (by 182 percent in 1987 alone) in order to align with prices previously 
registered in parallel markets. State farms and other small and medium enterprises 
went through a vast program of privatization which concluded only at the end of the 
1990s, in the attempt to re-launch production and reduce the debt burden of the state. 
Despite the destabilizing effects of the on-going civil war, which isolated 
farmers from markets especially in the center-north of the country, production of key 
food and cash crops (cassava, maize, cotton, peanuts and beans) increased. 
 
1994 to today 
 
With the signing of the peace agreement in 1992 and democratic elections in 1994, 
Mozambique entered into a new historical phase of high economic growth (7.8 
percent from 1993 to 2004).
3 Agriculture benefited probably more than other sectors 
from the end of the war, since farmers could get back to their land and 
commercialization became easier, despite the fact that the destruction of major 
transport infrastructure contributed to the segmentation of the internal market into 
three distinct geographic regions (South, Center and North). 
On average, real agricultural output grew of 6.2 percent between 1992 and 
2004, slightly lower than real GDP average growth (7.8 percent). The importance of 
the agricultural sector as a share of GDP gradually reduced, to 23 percent by 2004, but 
agriculture still remains the key sector in terms of employment.  
Basic food crops include cassava and maize grown mainly by smallholders (69 
percent and 63 percent of total production – TIA 2002), cassava being the more 
                                                 
3 Average real growth rate during this period excluding large project investments in natural resources 
and aluminum is 6.5 percent, the poverty headcount index moved from 69 percent in 1996/97 to 54 
percent in 2002/03, and agricultural incomes increased on average around 27 percent in the same 
period (Arndt, Jones and Tarp 2006).  
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important but mostly for subsistence consumption by producing households with very 
little marketed. Other major goods include rice, groundnuts and beans. Cash crops for 
smallholders include traditional ones, such as cotton, cashew and sugarcane, as well 
as “new” crops such as tobacco, oilseeds (sunflower, sesame, soybean) and spices 
(paprika, ginger). The percentage of farmers growing these new crops, despite being 
still limited, increased in the first part of the 1990s, signaling a possible diversification 
pattern confirmed by more-recent agricultural household surveys (Trabalho de 
Inquerito Agricola -TIA 2002).  
With the end of the armed conflict, the relative stabilization of the 
macroeconomic framework, and large inflows of foreign aid, the country had a 
propitious opportunity for the design of a long-term strategy for agricultural 
development. Unfortunately, Mozambique’s agricultural policy is still extremely 
fragmented and without a clear prioritization of objectives. Interventions seem to be 
more the heritage of past policies than the result of a new forward-looking strategy.  
 
 
Policy interventions in agriculture 
 
 
In this section we describe the different policy instruments of intervention used by the 
government, both general and product-specific (for a more extensive overview see 





Prior to independence, farmgate prices were regulated by the colonial government. 
These prices were established by a monopsonistic marketing board through which all 
commercial production had to be sold. This system continued after independence and 
throughout most of the war period. After independence, fixed prices for producers 
were set by the National Commission of Wages and Prices (CNPS), and all 
production had to be sold at the set price to AGRICOM, a parastatal marketing board, 
which then took care of distribution.   
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Prices began to be liberalized in the late 1980s, moving first from fixed to 
minimum prices, and soon afterwards were fully liberalized. Even though some 
minimum prices were introduced and were still present in the late 1990s, from 1996 
they were only indicative. Currently, only cotton is regulated with an established 
minimum price for producers.   
 
Commercialization 
Commercialization of agricultural products was carried out by a state monopsony 
during the colonial regime. After independence this same system continued, and the 
commercialization of all crops was controlled by AGRICOM, with the exception of 
cotton and cashew. AGRICOM was a state firm with a wholesale monopoly and 
regulated marketing margins. 
In the early 1990s, trading was liberalized in agriculture and private traders 
started entering agriculture markets. Restrictions regarding product movements across 
districts and provinces, and the colonial system of official geographic monopolies for 
traders, were removed in the early 1990s.  
 
Trade taxes 
During the colonial period the agricultural sector was extremely protected, and this 
high protection remained after independence and during the period of central 
planning.  
Mozambique became a signatory of GATT in 1992 and a foundation member 
of the WTO in 1995, but started applying an MFN tariff structure from 1989. Since 
then, import duties have been reduced and simplified. Agricultural products are 
subject to a 20 percent tariff as of 2006, except for those products considered inputs or 
basic food products. Maize and rice pay just 2.5 percent and sugar pays 7.5 percent. 
Tobacco and cottonseeds pay also 2.5 percent. Other products such as cashew, 
cassava, beans, tea and groundnut pay 20 percent. Preferential trade to other SADC 
countries did not start for agricultural products in Mozambique until 2007.  
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One agricultural product, sugar, is also subject to a variable tariff surcharge 
that depends on the international price of sugar on top of the normal duty of 7.5 
percent.
4  
Regarding export taxes, raw cashew exports were banned from 1976 to 1992 
in order to supply cheap inputs to the local cashew-processing industry. Raw cashew 
exports were liberalized in early 1992 but an export tax, still in place, was introduced 
in place of the ban. The cotton sector has an export tax too, of 2-3 percent, aimed at 
financing the Cotton Institute (IAM).
5  
 
Taxes and subsidies to production 
Production subsidies have not been an instrument of intervention in Mozambique, and 
there are no records of any direct subsidies to production. The main tax is VAT (17 
percent), which was introduced in 1998 to replace a consumption tax (5 percent). 
There are significant exemptions to VAT that affect agricultural products, including a 
total VAT exemption on seeds. Sugar imports are also VAT exempted. Nevertheless, 
the relevance of VAT for domestic production and sales is questionable. VAT is 
always levied on imports; however, most domestic production and retail sales of farm 
products do not pay any VAT. This implies that, de facto, VAT acts as a 17 percent 
import duty for agricultural products.  
 
Extension services 
Most farmers do not receive any extension service. These are mainly concentrated in a 
few crops, such as cotton, cashew, tobacco and maize. In the case of cotton, these 




                                                 
4 In 2004, for instance, this surcharge amounted to figures close to 60 percent, although in 2006, due to 
higher international prices, the surcharge was zero and only the standard duty applied. 
5 The export tax is mainly oriented to finance part of the IAM functioning, and some extension 
research, pest control and other agricultural services. In practice, however, the supply of such services 
by the IAM has been quite minimal due to the lack of human and financial resources.    
6 Some analysts suggest that these services tend to be of poor quality (see for example Sequeira and 
Garrido 1999). Boughton et al. (2003) and Walker et al. (2003) found a very limited impact of these 
services on agricultural production and rural incomes (Walker et al. 2003). Some NGOs, such as World 
Vision and CARE, and some donor agencies, offer some extension services under specific programs for 
cotton, tobacco, maize and cashew in the North of Mozambique.  
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Small-scale agriculture in Mozambique typically does not use purchased 
inputs, with less than 10 percent of smallholder producers using any kind of 
purchased inputs. The main sectors that make use of them are cotton and sugar, which 
do so through cotton and sugar private concessions. Input markets in Mozambique are 
more or less non-existent, and it is only very recently that some private importers 
established in Mozambique. Two donor-funded programs financed most imports of 
inputs for agriculture during the 1980s and 1990s: the Mozambique Nordic 
Agriculture Program (1977-90), and most importantly, the Japanese KRII program 
(1987-97). These two programs provided finance for the purchase of machinery, 
fertilizers and pesticides. But input interventions are concentrated in very specific 
crops and producers and have had very little impact on total agricultural production, 
in part because they are carried out in a fragmented way by NGOs and donor-funded 
programs. 
 
Product-specific interventions  
 
The different products analyzed in this study can be grouped according to their degree 
of intervention.
7
A first group of food crops formed by cassava, groundnut, beans, maize and 
rice have received hardly any government support or intervention. For this first group, 
the main type of government intervention is: (i) fixed and minimum pricing during the 
1970s and 1980s, and (ii) duties and VAT on imports. Maize, rice and groundnuts (in 
a lower extent) had some support by donor funded programs and NGOs regarding 
extension services and improved seed varieties, this, however, obtaining mixed 
results. 
A second group of products is tea and tobacco. These export cash crops have 
developed through government awarded concessions to private firms. Apart from 
designing and implementing the regulation relative to concessions, since the removal 
of minimum prices and the privatization of the tea plantations, no substantial 
government intervention could be identified in both sectors. 
                                                 
7 The main product specific interventions are described in Appendix 2, and Appendix 3 lists official 
interventions recorded at the government official bulletin (Boletím da República).  
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Finally, the last group includes three cash crops subject to heavy intervention: 
sugar, cotton and cashew. The sugar sector, after the privatization of the sugar 
plantations and mills, has been granted high protection and has received investment 
incentives such as duty and VAT exemptions for importing capital goods. The cotton 
sector is structured in a closed geographical concession system where farmers are 
forced to sell to the concessionary Ginning Company, and on exchange, they receive 
inputs and extension services on credit.
8 In the case of cashew, raw cashew exports 
were banned until 1991, and producer and factory gate prices were fixed since 
independence. In 1992, following World Bank suggestions, the sector was liberalized 
and raw cashew exports allowed through an export quota and subject to an export tax 
of 30 percent. In the following years, the quota was removed and the export tax was 
progressively reduced to 14 percent.  
 
Summary of main interventions 
 
Government interventions in agriculture can be clustered in three different periods, as 
follows: A first period, from 1975 until 1987, of central planning, where large 
plantations, commercialization and processing firms were state owned. During this 
period, the main instruments of government intervention were fixed and minimum 
prices aimed to subsidize consumer prices.  
The second period, from 1987 to 1998, was characterized by progressive price 
liberalization and privatization. In this period, prices and commercialization are 
gradually liberalized and the new tax structure started being introduced.  
In the third period, from 1999 until now, government intervention is largely 
restricted to import duties and VAT, while some specific sectors are highly 
intervened: sugar via import surcharge, cashew through export tax, tobacco through 
geographical concessions and cotton through minimum prices and closed 
geographical concessions.
9
                                                 
8 In the late 1990s and the geographical concession system was opened. Following the liberalization of 
the concession system, some ginning companies started experiencing financial difficulties and a year 
later the open concession system was abolished. 
9 In 1999, a donor funded sector wide program for agriculture (PROAGRI) of around US$ 200 millions 
was introduced. Although, it included support measures to extension and marketing, the program has 
been criticized for not having a significant impact on agriculture. The main objectives of PROAGRI are 




Measuring agricultural policy distortions  
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to measure the level of distortions induced by 
government policy interventions in the agricultural sector in Mozambique. The focus 
is on government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and 
what they would be under free markets (Anderson et al. 2008). Since it is not possible 
to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view 
alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural 
policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also 
generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative 
evaluation.
 
More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) 
for farmers including an adjustment for direct interventions on tradable inputs (border 
protection on fertilizers) and on non-tradable inputs (credit subsidies to farmers). It 
also generates an NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for 
agricultural tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see 




The products selected for the analysis are maize, beans (nhemba and butter), 
groundnuts, rice, cashew, cotton, sugar and tobacco plus the non-traded staples led by 
cassava but also including sorghum, potato, yam and millet. The main criteria for 
selecting these products were their importance for agricultural production in 
Mozambique, so as to cover around 70 percent of the value of production in primary 
agriculture (Figure 2), but data availability also was a constraint. The traded products 
                                                                                                                                            
(i) To improve the productive capacity and productivity of agriculture, the family sector and the private 
sector using labor-intensive technologies and sustainable management of natural resources. (ii) 
Guarantee access to land and reduce associated bureaucracy (iii) Promote and facilitate the marketing 
of agricultural and livestock products, and also the access to markets (for factors of production as well 




are the main agricultural products in terms of exports, rural incomes and focus of 
government intervention. 
Cassava is a non-tradable and complementary product to maize. It is grown by 
subsistence farmers, and while a low share of production is marketed it makes up 
close to half the value of farm production and is very important in the consumption of 
food by poor rural households (see Tarp et al. 2002). Groundnuts and beans are 
mainly produced in the center-north and traded in southern markets, where they 
compete with imports from South Africa. Most production of maize is carried out in 
the center-north, which registers some exports to Malawi, while in the south, 
Mozambican maize competes with imported maize mainly from South Africa. Rice is 
not extensively produced in Mozambique and there is only one rice mill in the south, 
which competes with Asian imported rice. In the center-north, paddy rice is milled 
and commercialized in small quantities by small scale processors. 
Tobacco and cotton are export crops organized around concession systems. 
Sugar is grown in large plantations that control production and milling, and only 
recently outgrowing schemes have been introduced. Finally, cashew is mainly a food 
crop produced by small scale farmers. Part of the production, however, is 




The main challenge in estimating any measure of assistance to agriculture in 
Mozambique is the lack of data. Data are scarce, and sometimes there are significant 
discrepancies among different sources.  
Producer, wholesale and retail prices started to be collected from 1991 or 
1994, depending on the crop, by the Agricultural Market Information System (SIMA) 
within the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). SIMA collects information in all the 
provinces of the country for several products. In the context of our sample, SIMA 
covers producer, wholesale and retail prices for maize, groundnuts (different types), 
beans (different types), cassava and rice.
10 In the case of sugar, data are only available 
from 1998 from the National Institute of Sugar (INA). Cotton and Cashew have long 
                                                 
10 SIMA prices data are collected in a large number of markets, at least two or three markets for each 
province. This implies that average prices are representative in geographical coverage, although they 
have not been weighted with provincial consumption shares.    
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historical series of prices from the Institute of Cotton (IAM) and INCAJU. This latter 
are also reported in McMillan, Horn and Rodrik (2003). 
The main problem for most products, with the exception of cashew and cotton, 
is the lack of price data for the 1970s and 1980s. However, this period is characterized 
by regulated prices, and therefore we use government established fixed and minimum 
prices based on Tarp (1990) and MINAG (1993). These prices tend to reflect accurate 
producer and retail prices until the early or mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s to the 
years of price liberalization, however, black markets became more and more 
important. This means that producers and retailers received higher prices and we may 
be underestimating domestic prices and overestimating the degree of taxation as 
expressed by the NRA estimates for this period.
11
For the case of cotton, this problem is present during the whole period of the 
study. There is evidence that some cotton companies pay prices different from the 
agreed price to farmers, reflecting production incentives and transport costs. 
Nevertheless, these price differentials are not very substantial. 
For international reference prices we use c.i.f. import unit values, if the 
product is importable, or f.o.b. export unit values, when exportable. When c.i.f. import 
unit values from the rest of the world are not available, we use South African export 
unit values applying a c.i.f. adjustment, since most imports in Mozambique come 
from South Africa anyway. 
We need to adjust prices for margins in order for them to be comparable. In 
the case of import-competing products, we assume that commercialization margins 
are equal for imported and domestic products, and we then adjust both prices with 
transport costs. In order to do this, we inflate both prices using data on domestic 
transport costs for maize available from SIMA from 2001 to 2005. We take as the 
point of comparison the city of Maputo, the largest market in the country. Thus, we 
compute the average transport costs from all the provinces of the country to Maputo 
and from the border with South Africa and Swaziland to Maputo, for the period 2001-
05. We then add this transport cost coefficient as percentage of producer price and as 
percentage of c.i.f. unit values to inflate the prices when we calculate the NRA. We 
apply this kind of adjustment to maize, groundnuts and beans.
12 For rice and sugar, 
                                                 
11 In addition, we have some missing observations for some products for the early 1990s. 
12 Three issues have to be taken into account when doing this. First, not all production is sold in 
Maputo; a significant amount is commercialized in central and northern provincial markets. Second,  
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we apply transport cost adjustments available specifically for these products (also 
from SIMA).   
In the case of export products, we need to calculate the margin and transport 
cost adjustment to the border. For cotton it is not required, since cotton lint is exported 
by cotton processors directly so there is no intermediary involved. For cashew, we use 
the margins for traders suggested in McMillan, Horn and Rodrik (2003), 50 percent 
on producer price and 40 percent on processor price. For maize, we use the average of 
transport costs from Center-North region to Malawi as percentage of price from 2001 
and 2005 as transport costs plus a 30 percent trader margin as suggested by MIC 
(2001). 
For nontradable staple foods, we take prices and quantities from the FAO 
database, and assume their NRAs are zero. 
The exchange rate was liberalized in the early 1990s very gradually, and some 
capital controls still remain. Following Anderson et al. (2008) we use a weighted 
average between the official and the parallel exchange rate, as the equilibrium 




The NRA five-year average estimates are tabulated in Tables 1 and 2, and shown in 
Figures 3 and 4. To compute the NRA measures we use, whenever data are available, 
a measure based on averages taken during commercialization (post-harvest) periods, 
and when this is not possible, we use yearly average producer prices.
13  
In the case of import-competing products, the results show a very clear 
common pattern in NRA values for all products (Figure 3). In this pattern, we can 
identify the different periods described earlier. In the first period, 1976-90 of fixed 
and minimum pricing, NRA coefficients are highly negative, reflecting the 
government goal of subsidizing consumer prices via low fixed producer prices and 
                                                                                                                                            
transport costs for maize do not necessarily reflect costs of other products. Third, we assume a constant 
transport cost ratio between border-Maputo and rest of the country-Maputo through time. Nevertheless, 
and despite these strong assumptions, what is relevant when using this approach is the accuracy of the 
ratio between the two price adjustment coefficients. This ratio should also approximate the ratio of 
transporting another product from a remote farm to a central provincial market with respect the 
transport costs from the nearest port to the same market. 
13 For most products, NRA values are higher when yearly averages are taken due to higher producer 
prices experienced during off season. This may be misleading since in the absence of storage 
infrastructure, prices that most producers receive are likely to be the prices recorded during post harvest 
periods.  
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fixed margins. These negative NRA values continue until the early 1990s, but we are 
overestimating the degree of taxation expressed by the NRA by the end of this period: 
the lack of market producer prices required us to use government-established 
minimum prices, which are likely to be below actual prices received by producers. 
The second period, 1991-97, is the period of price liberalization, and in our 
estimations we shift from using minimum to collected producer prices (SIMA). For 
the reasons underlined above, it is likely that the rise in the NRA that we observe from 
1990 actually began a couple of years earlier. During this period, domestic prices rose 
in order to achieve market-clearing conditions. Furthermore, NRA coefficients start 
becoming positive due to the introduction of taxes on imports and exports. 
The third period shows a peak for the NRA in 1998, and fluctuates around 
positive values that mainly reflect import duties. Note that volatility increases in this 
period. Such an increase, when using observed producer prices, is consistent with the 
experiences of other countries in the Africa region.  
NRA rates seem to oscillate during the period 1995-2000 around the value of 
the import tariff, plus the VAT in some cases.
14 Nevertheless, the average NRA 
estimates for 2001-03 decrease significantly. The fact that there is a lack of 
government intervention in the sector implies that the actual NRA values should 
theoretically converge to import tariffs and VAT rates. Thus, the differences observed 
may well correspond to measurement errors. 
The case of exportable goods seems to be slightly different from import-
competing products. Despite the trend of shifting from a negative NRA towards zero 
with the process of price liberalization, the trend after the 1990s is different across 
products. In the case of exportable maize in central and northern regions, the trend is 
to converge to the expected zero NRA due to absence of intervention, while for cotton 
lint it converges to the export tax. For cashew and tobacco, NRA estimates remain 
negative for longer.  
 
Evolution of NRAs by product 
 
Maize 
                                                 
14 VAT is not paid along the value chain of agricultural products, from the farm to the market, since 
small businesses are not required to charge VAT. Nevertheless, unless the product is exempted, VAT is 
always paid at the border and, therefore, acts de facto as an import tariff.  
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Maize is a product imported in the southern region, while being exported from the 
Center and the North of the country. High transport costs make trading maize from 
north to south not profitable, and maize surplus is therefore exported to Malawi, while 
the deficit in the South is largely covered by maize from South Africa. For this reason, 
we compute the NRA at these regional levels.  
In the South, where maize is importable, the NRA follows the trend described 
in the previous section for import-competing products. In the first phase, there is a 
negative NRA due to fixed and minimum pricing with the objective of subsidizing 
consumer prices in urban areas. In the second phase, prices are liberalized and the 
NRA becomes positive, tending to converge to the import tariff. The final period is 
characterized by high volatility of the NRA. However, in the absence of other policy 
interventions, the actual NRA should lie around the import tariff plus VAT rate.  
In the Center-North, where maize is exportable, the picture is quite different. 
Our estimates, accounting for fixed transport costs and trading margins of around 41 
percent, indicate a negative NRA during most of the period before 1990 of between -
55 and -60 percent. For the period since then, we assume a zero NRA in the absence 
of government intervention after price liberalization.  
 
Beans 
There are two main types of beans produced in Mozambique, nhemba and butter. 
Beans are mainly produced in the Center-North and the quantities commercialized are 
mainly consumed in the South. The fact that nhemba beans are a domestic variety 
simplifies the calculations. There are no possible reference prices for this type of 
bean, since it is only produced in Mozambique, and therefore, in the absence of 
intervention, the NRA can be assumed to be zero. In the case of butter beans, they 
compete with beans imported from South Africa. For the period for which we have 




Rice in Mozambique is mainly produced by small-scale farmers. More than 75 
percent of production is concentrated in the center-north of the country. Rice 
produced in the South is milled in the only existing industrial mill in the country,  
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while the rice produced in the Center-North is milled directly by farmers and then 
sold. In this case, producer and processor prices coincide. The trend of the NRA for 
this product is similar to the rest of import-competing crops, from highly negative in 
the early period shifts towards positive rates similar to the import tariff plus VAT.  
 
Tobacco 
Tobacco is an export crop organized in a system of geographical concessions, first 
state-owned and then private. The NRA was more than -50 percent before 
liberalization, and thereafter converges to zero.  
 
Cotton 
Cotton is a very important activity in rural areas and is highly regulated. Table 2 
shows a highly negative NRA for cotton producers, but with a highly positive trend 
following the privatization of the ginning sector, when ginners were allowed to export 
directly to the international market. The lack of quality adjustment may explain some 
of the price differential, but the result seems to be consistent with the findings by 
Boughton et al. (2003) of low quality and also very low producer prices in 
Mozambique compared to other African countries. 
 
Cashew 
The cashew sector has been the subject of intense debate in the last two decades. This 
is one of the main crops in Northern Provinces and the processing industry was 
traditionally one of the main sources of industrial employment, and after the reform 
many of the processing unions were forced to close down, unable to compete with 
prices offered by traders that export raw cashew for processing in India. 
These reforms can be easily identified in the NRA evolution. In the case of 
cashew producers, after independence, and with the export ban, NRAs are negative 
and very high, indicating a large tax on producers to subsidize the processing industry 
with cheap raw cashews. Following the replacement of the export ban with an export 
tax, the NRA became less negative. The gap between producer price and border price, 
once controlled for the traders’ margin, narrowed considerably over the 1990s and the 




Sugar is a very important focus of government support in terms of agro industrial 
policy. The structure of the sector, where processors control production, implies that 
the relevant support measure for sugar is the processor NRA.
15 This product has been 
considered exportable from 1975 to 1982 and importable afterwards.
16 During the 
1970s the sector was nationalized, and it operated with state-owned plantations that 
were privatized in the 1990s. This is represented by a negative NRA during the period 
until prices were liberalized and farms privatized. Then import tariffs became the 
main influence on the NRA. 
 
Aggregate NRAs and the RRA  
 
The NRAs for covered agricultural products as a whole move from around -50 percent 
in the period to 1990 to an average of zero in the 1990s and to just above zero in the 
present decade. If we assume non-covered products are not distorted (since many of 
them are nontraded horticultural and livestock products), the overall NRAs for the 
farm sector are somewhat closer to zero. The NRA for just tradable farm products is 
however very negative prior to the 1990s’ liberalization. When that is compared with 
the positive NRA for tradable non-agricultural products, by way of computing the 
relative rate of assistance, the RRA is highly negative until the reforms begin to make 
their mark in the 1990s, and then converges to zero and even becomes slightly 
positive after 2000 (Table 2 and Figure 3).  
  The final set of rows in Table 2 shows what the distortion indicators would 
have been had the distortions to exchange rates not been taken into account. They 
suggest that less than one-eighth of the RRA in the 1980s was due just to exchange 
rate distortions, and that influence has since disappeared. 
 
 
Conclusions and prospects for further policy reform 
 
 
                                                 
15 For the NRA aggregation we assume full pass-through of the distortion to sugar cane farmers 
16 With the rehabilitation program in the 1990s and the protection granted to the domestic market, 
production increased but is oriented towards the national market (relatively profitable), where 
Mozambique’s sugar competes mainly with sugar from South Africa or Swaziland. Exports are 
growing but are limited to the more profitable preferential markets in the EU and the United States.  
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The agricultural sector in Mozambique has undergone a process of progressive 
liberalization and elimination of government intervention. The country shifted from 
central planning, concession systems and the use of fixed and minimum pricing in the 
ten years after independence towards a market economy from the early 1990s. Since 
those economic reforms began, government intervention has been minimal and based 
mainly on the use of import tariffs, with the exception of cotton, cashew and sugar 
where more complex policies have been implemented. Sugar now has a large positive 
NRA based on a very high import surcharge. While this is not unlike many other 
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Figure 1: Real GDP, Mozambique, 1970 to 2004  
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Source: Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2006)  
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Figure 2: Shares of covered products in the value of primary agricultural production, 
Mozambique, 1976 to 2003 
 






















































































Source: Authors’ compilation using FAO price and quantity data.  
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a 










1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
total import-competing products exportables
 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing 




Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural 
tradable industries, and relative rates of assistance
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RRA agricultural tradables nonagricultural tradables
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Mozambique, 1976 to 2003 
(percent) 
    1976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Import-competing products
a, b -67.7 -63.6 -72.2 -5.2 29.5 55.4
Rice  -67.3 -52.0 -75.6 -49.6 7.5 25.8
Maize South  -63.4 -54.9 -66.2 7.6 10.1 19.9
Bean  n.a. n.a. n.a. 26.0 43.9 50.6
Groundnut  -67.9 -67.9 -65.4 5.0 18.5 46.3
        
Exportables
a, b -70.0 -68.6 -76.4 -25.5 -3.1 -1.0
Maize Centre  -55.6 -56.2 -61.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maize North  -55.6 -56.2 -61.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cashew  -85.6 -90.1 -90.3 -72.9 -13.8 -5.5
Cotton  -64.0 -63.8 -65.0 -1.4 -2.7 -2.4
Tobacco  -64.5 -58.0 -54.8 -31.6 -19.0 0.0
        
Mixed trade status
a       
Sugar  -59.8 -65.7 -65.8 18.9 90.5 101.8
        
Nontradables  00000  0
Cassava  0 0000  0
Millet  00000  0
Potato  00000  0
Sorghum  00000  0
Yam  00000  0
   
Total of covered products
a -48.5 -41.6 -51.4 -3.9 4.9 7.2
Dispersion of covered products
c   36.9 33.9 38.1 26.6 30.3 30.1
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  70 61 60 73 80 71
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups 
depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the 
weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.  
  
27
Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural 
industries, Mozambique, 1976 to 2003 
(percent) 
    1976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Covered products  -48.5 -41.6 -51.4 -3.9 4.9 7.2
Non-covered products   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All agricultural products  -42.8 -19.0 -38.3 -5.0 2.2 5.1
Trade bias index
a -0.05 0.08 0.38 -0.20 -0.25 -0.36
    
Assistance to just tradables:    
   All agricultural tradables  -70.1 -67.3 -75.1 -15.4 16.3 26.0
   All non-agricultural tradables  28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.2 23.1
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
b -76.7 -74.4 -80.6 -33.9 -9.4  2.4
    
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:    
  NRA, all agric. products  -24.3 -12.7 -36.3 -3.6 2.2 5.1
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)
b -60.1 -66.4 -75.8 -33.1 -9.4  2.3
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm 
and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 





Price to wholesaler and CIF price adjustment 
In our calculations of the NRAs we use as the point of reference for the domestic price 
(reference price) what we call "price to wholesaler". This includes the price paid to farmer 
plus internal trade costs (storage and transport to relevant market). The margin of the 
wholesaler is not included so this is not the true wholesaler price. In order to compare such 
price with the international one, we inflate cif prices (border prices) with internal trade costs 
to bring the good to the same relevant market. Such price, again, does not include any margin 
for the distributor. Implicitly we are assuming that margins for wholesalers who are trading 
domestic goods are the same for wholesalers trading foreign goods so both margins 
eventually balance each other in the calculation of the NRAs and can be left aside.  
 
Seasonal and yearly prices 
For some products we computed NRAs using both seasonal and yearly price data. However, 
it has to be noticed that for aggregation (sector NRA and overall RRA) we use only seasonal 
NRAs. 
 
Value of production at reference price (undistorted) – Agricultural goods 
We first compute the “undistorted reference price” for each good i by dividing the reference 
price (see above) by (1+NRAi). Due to lack of production and/or producer price data for 
some products (primary agriculture and lightly processed goods) for many years in our 
sample, we cannot compute production value at reference prices directly. In order to 
overcome this problem we first compute the shares of production (at reference price and by 
product) over total production for the available years. Then, we take the average shares of the 
products with missing data in the available years and assume this as their share in the years in 
which we do not have information. This results in "adjusted shares of production” that can be 
finally used as weights for the calculation of sector (IMP, EXP, NT) and total NRAs.  
 
NRA gaps 
Due to lack of data on either domestic prices or international prices we experience some gaps 
in our NRA calculations. In order to fill the gaps we take the median of neighbouring years 
(before and after - up to four years where possible). We decide not to use the simple average 
due to the fact that there are some negative NRAs among our results. 
 
Value of production – Non agricultural goods 
Values of production for non agricultural goods are not available so we use sector shares of 
GDP as a mean to compute weights for the calculation of non-agricultural NRA and overall 
RRA.  
 
Transmission factors  
We assume an equi-proportionate pass-through of distortion from the primary product to the 
farm gate level or to the processed good.  
 
NRAs for husked rice, sugar cane and seed cotton 
We do not compute NRAs for husked rice and cane sugar while we use Zimbabwe and 
Zambia prices of seed cotton (from Ndela and Robinson 2007 and Robinson, Govereh and  
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Ndela 2007) to compute a guesstimate of the NRA for seed cotton in Mozambique. The 
reason why we do not compute any NRA for sugar cane is because there is no independent 
production of this good in Mozambique since millers are directly producing all their sugar 
cane. Concerning rice, the processor described in our spreadsheet refers to a producer who 
outsources the operation of de-husking to small millers and then sells the processed rice 
directly. Producer and processor in this case coincide. Such a figure of producer/processor is 





Production volume data for agricultural products and lightly processed foods are from the 
Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (Departamento de Aviso Previo and Direcção 
Nacional de Agricultura), the National Institute of Sugar, the National Institute of Cotton 
(IAM), The National Institute of Cashew (INCAJU) and FAOSTAT (2006) (Food and 
Agriculture Organization Statistics Database).  
Export and import volume data are from Customs of Mozambique (TIMS database), UN 
COMTRADE (Commodity Trade Statistics) (2006) and FAOSTAT (2006). 
Farm-gate product prices are from the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (Estatisticas 
Agrarias and SIMA – Sistema de Informação de Mercados Agrícolas), the Ministry of 
Finance of Mozambique and FAOSTAT (2006). For cotton, cottonseed prices are average 
producer prices from Zimbabwe and Zambia (Ndela and Robinson 2007) 
Wholesale product prices.  Computed by inflating producer price to internal transport cost 
and therefore not inclusive of any wholesaler margin (see Value of production at reference 
price – Agricultural goods) above. Internal transport costs data are from Cirera and Arndt 
(2006). 
Intermediate input prices and input-output value coefficients. There are no data available 
on intermediate input prices. Input-output coefficients are from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Border prices. Fob and Cif prices are calculated from export unit values and import unit 
values based on COMTRADE (2006) and FAOSTAT (2006). Cif price for brown sugar is 
derived from international price inflated by freight costs - data are from the National Institute 
of Sugar. We do not compute any quality adjustment. 
Exchange rates. Official exchange rates are from World Development Indicators (WDI 
2006). Parallel market rates are from IMF (2005). Parallel exchange rates are assumed to be 
the black market rates from 1980 to 1993, as reported in International Currency Analysis 
(1993 and earlier years) and reproduced as premia in Easterly (2006); before 1980 multiple 
exchange rates operated and the rates for different product groups are reported in IMF (2005 
and earlier years). 
Production, consumption, input and trade taxes and subsidies. Taxes and subsidies data 
are from the National Institute of Sugar, the National Institute of Cotton (IAM), the National 
Institute of Cashew (INCAJU), the Ministry of Finance of Mozambique and Customs of 
Mozambique (Alfandegas). Appendix Table 1: Agricultural production, Mozambique, 1975 to 2005  
(kt) 
Product  Source   1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986  1987 1988 1989 
B e a n s     ( a ) A G M I N                   
Sugar  Cane  INA  2297.8 2079.6 1917.9 2125.1 2074.7 1719.3 1822.9 1505.8  875.9  490.7  277.8  194.3  227.8  220.6  255.4 
Brown  Sugar  INA  231.7 216.1 182.9 215.9 203.8 170.4 169.7 125.7  73.7  39.3  23.6  16.3  19.4  19.2  24.9 
Cashew  nut  (raw)  FAO  122.0  91.5 61.0 66.0 71.1 71.1 61.0 35.6 20.3 25.0 30.0 35.0  45.0 50.2 22.5 
Cashew nut 
( s h e l l e d )   F   A O                 




IAM  39.0 28.0 17.0 24.0 13.0 21.0 24.0 18.0  8.0  7.0  1.0  4.0  9.0  7.0  9.0 
Groundnut  in  shell  FAO  140.0 130.0 130.0 125.0 130.0 133.0 130.0 120.0 110.0 100.0 100.0 101.0 105.0  110.0 110.0 
Groundnut  shelled  FAO  98.0 91.0 91.0 87.5 91.0 93.1 91.0 84.0 77.0 70.0 70.0 70.7  73.5 77.0 77.0 
Maize  FAO  250.0 450.0 430.0 420.0 400.0 380.0 370.0 350.0 330.0 350.0 400.0 459.0 271.0  322.0 330.0 
Cassava    FAO  3250.0 3300.0 3350.0 3400.0 3500.0 3600.0 3600.0 3650.0 3700.0 3700.0 3600.0 3600.0 3700.0 3600.0 3700.0 
Rice  (paddy)  FAO  101.0  45.0 68.0 52.0 70.0 75.0 78.0 80.0 82.0 84.0 86.0 93.0  90.0 93.0 95.0 
Rice (milled)  FAO  67.4  30.0  45.4 34.7 46.7 50.0 52.0 53.4 54.7 56.0 57.4 62.0 60.0 62.0 63.4 
Tea  FAO  13.1 13.8 17.0 18.1 18.9 19.5 22.2 21.0 15.0 11.0  7.0  5.0  3.0  1.5  2.5 
Product  Source   1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004 
Beans  (a)  MINAG        95.3  134.2 140.6 152.8 191.1 188.6 146.4 155.9 177.4 179.6  192.8   
Sugar  Cane  INA  331.6 252.8 151.1 184.5 234.0 313.2 315.9 278.9 368.7 469.5 397.3 675.6 1586.3  1940.8  1873.3 
Brown  Sugar  INA  31.7 24.6 13.2 15.6 19.2 28.4 29.3 25.2 38.6 50.7 39.0 67.3 171.1  212.2  205.1 
Cashew  nut  (raw)  FAO  31.1 54.2 23.9 23.0 33.4 66.5 43.3 51.7 58.7 57.9 58.0 58.0  58.0 58.0 58.0 
Cashew nut 
(shelled)  FAO    124.8 154.4  68.1  73.5  123.6 144.0 132.0 130.5  84.8  0.0  32.6  27.0  15.6  16.6 




IAM  8.0  13.2 16.4 15.5 16.7 17.0 17.0 23.9 30.0 30.0 11.3 24.0  25.0 25.0 27.7 
Groundnut  in  shell  FAO  113.0 115.0  67.3  101.0  83.0  108.3 122.5 116.6 124.2 283.5 129.1 127.4 115.2  109.9 127.5 
Groundnut  shelled  FAO  79.1 80.5 61.0 58.8 51.8 71.4 81.9 88.4  100.1  102.9  80.2 76.5  76.9 76.9   
Maize  FAO  452.9 327.1 132.1 533.1 489.5 734.0 947.0  1042.0  1123.9  1246.1  1019.0  933.9 1235.6  1247.9  1437.0 
Cassava    FAO  4590.4 3690.5 3238.9 3511.2 3351.6 4178.0 4734.0 5336.7 5639.0 5352.8 5362.0 5988.3 5924.6 6149.9 6412.8 
Rice  (paddy)  FAO  96.4  56.3  32.6  65.6  101.2 113.0 139.0 180.2 191.0 186.2 151.4 168.1 167.9  200.4 177.4 
Rice (milled)  FAO  64.3  37.6  21.8 43.8 67.5 75.4 92.7  120.2 127.4 124.2 101.0 112.1 112.0  133.7   
Tea  FAO  4.0 4.9 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5 
Source: FAO and MINAG Appendix Table 2: Annual distortion estimates, Mozambique, 1976 to 2003 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products
a 
(percent) 












1976 na  -79 -79 -79 -86 -86 -86 -85  -80  -78  -64 
1977 na  -92 -85 -82 -74 -74 -83 -82  -79  -80  -64 
1978 na  -86 -43 -53 -88 -88 -50 -56  -44  -53  -44 
1979 na  -85 -50 -58  25  25 -35 -45  -36  -46  -21 
1980 na  -90 -48 -74 -62 -62 -52 -46  -58  -27  -45 
1981 na  -90 -53 -49 -48 -48 -46 -46  -58  -45  -33 
1982 na  -82 -52 -51 -56 -56 -29 -26  -58  -51  -25 
1983 na  -89 -69 -71 -57 -57 -53 -48  -61  -71  -31 
1984 na  -99 -97 -95 -57 -57 -94 -94  -93  -95  -75 
1985 na  -98 -97 -95 -57 -57 -91 -91  -94  -96  -74 
1986 na  -99 -96 -96 -57 -57 -94 -93  -96  -70  -79 
1987 na  -98 -80 -77 -72 -72 -64 -67  -49  -54  -50 
1988 na  -79 -53 -63 -59 -59 -42 -64  -43  -35  -30 
1989  na  -76 0 5  -63  -63  -40  -63  -47  -18 -25 
1990  na  -75 0 5 0 0 8  -51  -38  -52  -8 
1991  na  -65 0 5 0 0 8  -43  36  -56  -3 
1992  na  -58 0 5 0 0 8  -59  31  6  -3 
1993  26  -79  -3 5 0 0 8  -49  31  -44  -2 
1994  26  -88  -3 5 0 0 8  -46  34  -12  -4 
1995  26  -33  -3 5 0 0 8  -40  6  -33  2 
1996  42  -15  -3 8 0 0 8  13  40  -62  4 
1997  42  -9  -2 8 0 0 8  13  152  0  5 
1998  58  -7  -2  20 0 0 8  26  146  0  6 
1999  52  -4 -2 52  0  0 20 26  108  0  8 
2000  52  -1 -2 46  0  0 20 26  94  0  7 
2001  52  -12 -2 46  0  0 20 26  97  0  6 
2002  52  -5 -2 46  0  0 20 26  114  0  8 
2003  46  -4 -2 46  0  0 20 26  102  0  8 
 
a. Cassava, millet, potato, sorghum and yam are assumed to have a zero NRA for the studied 
period, and are included in the NRA weighted average for covered products. 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Mozambique, 1976 to 2003  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
   (percent) 
Total ag NRA 
Covered products 














1976  0 -64  0  -48  -81  28 -85 
1977  0 -64  0  -48  -83  28 -86 
1978  0 -44  0  -46  -71  28 -77 
1979  0 -21  0  -30  -46  28 -58 
1980  0 -45  0  -14  -66  28 -73 
1981  0 -33  0  -26  -58  28 -67 
1982  0 -25  0  -19  -55  28 -64 
1983  0 -31  0  -16  -65  28 -73 
1984  0 -75  0  -20  -93  28 -95 
1985  0 -74  0  -45  -91  28 -93 
1986  0 -79  0  -49  -92  28 -94 
1987  0 -50  0  -52  -77  28 -82 
1988  0 -30  0  -28  -62  28 -71 
1989  0 -25  0  -16  -53  28 -63 
1990  0 -8  0 -14  -24  28  -41 
1991  0 -3  0  -5  -15  28  -34 
1992  0 -3  0  -2  -19  28  -37 
1993  0 -2  0  -2  -7  28  -27 
1994  0 -4  0  -1  -12  28  -31 
1995  0 2 0 -3  4 28  -18 
1996  0 4 0  2  12 26  -10 
1997  0 5 0  3  16 28  -9 
1998  0 6 0  4  22 30  -6 
1999  0 8 0  5  26 30  -3 
2000  0 7 0  6  24 24 0 
2001  0 6 0  5  27 20 5 
2002  0 8 0  4  25 24 0 
2003  0 8 0  6  28 23 4 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
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Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Mozambique, 1976 to 2003  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 







North  Cashew Cotton  Tobacco  Sugar  Cassava
  
1976 4 2 9 6 7 6 3  1  21  14 
1977 4 2  11 3 4  11 5  1  14  14 
1978 2 1 6  10  11 3 1  1 9  23 
1979 3 1 9 1 1 4 2  1  10  34 
1980 2 1  11 4 4 5 3  1 9  15 
1981 2 1 7 2 3 5 3  1 9  22 
1982 2 1 7 4 4 3 1  1 6  31 
1983 3 1  10 3 4 3 1  1 4  29 
1984 9 3  20 1 1 6 1  2 4  10 
1985 9 4  21 2 3 8 3  2 2  10 
1986  10 5  19 2 2  12 4  1 2 8 
1987 4 1  13 5 5 6 1  1 1  16 
1988 4 1 8 4 4 4 1  0 1  25 
1989 5 1 3 5 5 4 1  0 2  25 
1990 5 1 3 3 3 2 1  1 2  34 
1991 2 1 3 3 2 2 1  1 1  56 
1992 1 0 3 1 1 3 1  0 0  58 
1993 2 1 3 3 3 2 1  1 1  51 
1994 3 1 3 1 3 4 1  0 1  48 
1995 3 2 5 4 4 1 1  0 1  40 
1996 3 2 4 2 3 2 2  0 1  51 
1997  na 2 4 3 3 1 2  0 0  55 
1998  na 2 5 3 3 1 2  1 0  52 
1999 5 0 4 2 3 2 0  1 1  44 
2000 1 1 3 2 2 2 1  1 1  47 
2001 1 1 3 2 2 1 1  1 1  47 
2002  na 1 2 5 5 1 1  2 2  43 
2003  na 2 2 3 5 1 1  0 3  45  
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Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Mozambique, 1976 to 2003  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Beans  Millet Potato  Sorghum  Yam 
Non-
covered 
1976  na 0 0  1 0  26 
1977  na 0 0  1 0  29 
1978  na 0 1  1 0  32 
1979  na 0 1  1 0  32 
1980  na 0 1  1 0  42 
1981  na 0 1  2 0  41 
1982  na 0 2  2 1  36 
1983  na 0 1  2 1  37 
1984  na 0 1  1 0  40 
1985  na 0 1  1 0  33 
1986  na 0 0  1 0  33 
1987  na 0 1  2 0  44 
1988  na 0 1  2 1  44 
1989  na 0 1  3 1  44 
1990  na 0 1  3 1  40 
1991  na 0 4  1 1  23 
1992  na 0 4  1 1  24 
1993 5 0 3  1 1  23 
1994 6 0 3  1 1  23 
1995  11 0 2  1 0  22 
1996 7 0 3  2 1  17 
1997 7 0 2  2 1  17 
1998 6 1 2  4 0  16 
1999 4 1 2  4 0  27 
2000 4 0 2  2 0  28 
2001 3 1 2  4 0  30 
2002 3 0 2  3 0  28 
2003 5 0 2  3 0  28 
Source: Authors’s spreadsheet 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices  
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 Appendix Table 3: Harvest and commercialization periods, Mozambique 
 
 Harvest  Commercialization  
Beans  April-May  
March-June  
March-July  
Cassava  All  year  All  year  
Cashew   October-January          North  
November-February    South  
October-February  
Rice   March-May    South  
May-July        Center-North  
March-August  
Groundnut  April-May  April-June  
Maize  March-June  March-July  
Cotton  June-July  June-July  
Sugar  April-December  April-January  









Maize  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Fixed Min Min Min Min Min Min Lib  Lib  Lib 
Rice  Fixed Fixed  Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed  Fixed Lib  Lib  Lib 
Beans 
butter  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min  Lib  Lib 
Beans 
nhemba  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min  Lib  Lib 
Groundnuts Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Lib  Lib  Lib 
Cassava  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib  Lib  Lib 
Cashew  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min  Lib  Lib 
Sugar  Fixed Fixed  Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Lib Distrib 
Cotton  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min  Min  Min 
Tea  Fixed  Prod  Prod  Prod  Prod  Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib Lib  Lib  Lib 
Tobacco  Fixed Fixed  Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed  Fixed Fixed Lib  Lib 
Fixed: fixed at all levels; Prod - determined by producers on the basis of production costs; Min – minimum producer price and fixed consumer price; Lib – liberalized at all 
levels; Distrib – established by distributor 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration 
 Appendix Table 5: Exchange rates, Mozambique, 1975 to 2004 
 
(local currency per US dollar) 
 










market rate  
Estimated equilibrium 




1975  26  245  0.50  245  190  
1976  30  287  0.50  287  223  
1977  33  305  0.50  305  237  
1978  33  102  0.50  102  85  
1979  33  81  0.50  81  69  
1980  32  78  0.50  78  67  
1981  35  73  0.50  73  64  
1982  38  98  0.50  98  83  
1983  40  155  0.50  155  126  
1984  42  1400  0.50  1400  1061  
1985  43  1817  0.50  1817  1373  
1986  40  1984  0.50  1984  1498  
1987  291  1096  0.50  1096  895  
1988  525  1183  0.50  1183  1018  
1989  745  1933  0.50  1933  1636  
1990  929  2155  0.50  2155  1849  
1991  1434  2194  0.50  2194  2004  
1992  2517  2894  0.50  2894  2800  
1993  3874  4500  0.50  4500  4344  
1994  6039  6679  0.50  6679  6519  
1995  9024  9611  0.50  9611  9464  
1996  11294  11909  0.50  11909  11755  
1997  11544  11708  0.50  11708  11667  
1998  11875  12057  0.50  12057  12011  
1999  12775  12844  0.50  12844  12827  
2000  15227  15996  0.50  15996  15804  
2001  20704  21139  0.50  21139  21030  
2002  23678  24281  0.50  24281  24130  
2003  23782  24226  0.50  24226  24115  
2004  22581  23166  0.50  23166  23020  
a  The proportion of foreign currency actually sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate. 
b  See Anderson et al. (2008) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study  
 